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RECENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EFFECT OF COERCED
CONFESSION HELD TO CARRY OVER TO
LATER CONFESSION
After days of intensive police questioning, a state-employed
psychiatrist induced the petitioner to confess to murder by means
of mental coercion and promises. This confession was followed
by others to a police captain, a business associate, and two prosecutors. The first conviction was reversed by the New York Court
of Appeals because the coerced confession was used in evidence.
At the second trial only the subsequent confessions were used,
the question of their voluntariness being submitted to the jury.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and the petitioner
then sought habeas corpus in the federal courts. Held (5-3) reversing: The effect of the coercion used in obtaining the first
confession carried over and controlled the character of the subsequent confessions. Leyra v. Denno, 347 U. S. 556 (1954).
When a defendant has made a timely assertion of his right
under the Federal Constitution to have his guilt or innocence of
a capital crime determined without reliance upon confessions
obtained by means proscribed by the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court must determine independently whether the confessions were so obtained, by review of
the facts upon which that issue necessarily turns. Chambers v.
Florida,309 U. S. 227 (1940). The performance of this duty cannot be foreclosed by the finding of a trial judge or the verdict of
a jury or both. Lisbenda v. California,314 U. S. 219 (1941).
If this review discloses that the accused was not mentally
free to confess or deny the suspected participation in the crime
at the time of his confession, the Supreme Court will reverse the
conviction. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278 (1936) (physical
torture); Asheraft v. Tennessee, 322 U. S. 143 (1944) (prolonged
questioning without sleep); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U. S. 596
(1948) (fifteen year old boy questioned in dead of night without
counsel); Malinski v. New York, 324 U. S. 401 (1945) (prisoner
held for three days in hotel stripped of clothing).
When the issue has been fairly tried and reviewed, however,
and there is no indication that constitutional standards of judgment have been disregarded, the Supreme Court will accord to
the state's own decision great, and in the absence of impeachment
by conceded facts, decisive respect. Stein v. New York, 346 U. S.
156, 182 (1953).
The standard which the Supreme Court will use in cases of
multiple confessions was established in Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322
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U. S. 596 (1944). If the relation between the earlier and later
confession is so close that there can be no other inference than
that the facts of one control the character of the other, the Court
will reverse. Otherwise the question is for the triers of fact and
their conclusion, in such an uncertain situation, that the confession is voluntary, cannot be a denial of due process. It must be
pointed out that in the instant case the confessions took place in
the same building during a short period of time while in the Lyons
case the second confession took place in a different city more than
twelve hours after the first. The majority in the present case
found all of the confessions to be part of one continuous process,
and therefore, involuntary as a matter of law. The dissent, relying heavily on the Lyons case, argued that the finding of the jury
that the subsequent confessions were not coerced should have been
upheld.
In Illinois it has been held that confessions following an original coerced confession are presumed to be involuntary. People
v. Sweetin, 325 Ill. 245, 156 N. E. 354 (1927). This presumption
can be overcome only by showing that from lapse of time, or
otherwise, the party confessing was no longer dominated by the
influence which had induced the original confession. Recent decisions in other jurisdictions have held the coercive effect of the
first confession broken by a two week passage of time, Cooper v.
, 106 A. 2d 129 (1954), and a warning to the
State, __ Md.
accused of his rights before his subsequent confession a day later.
State v. Haner, 240 N. C. 85, 81 S. E. 2d 193 (1954).
The decision of this case seems sound where the confessions
are so close that they can reasonably be found to be part of one
continuous process. In borderline situations, however, the juryis in a better position to hear testimony and decide the mental
state of the accused than an appellate court. Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court, as the final protector of individual rights, has
given notice here, as in the past, that it will not tolerate "third
degree" methods of police investigation.
Richard C. Wagner
CRIMINAL LAW -LOSS OFJURSDICTION BY DELAY
IN PRONOUNCEMENT OF SENTENCE
Judgment was entered in burglary prosecution continuing the
matter under advisement so long as defendant remained in the
State Epileptic Village and complied with its rules and regulations.
After defendant's escape from the Village and recapture, judgment of guilty of burglary was entered and sentence was imposed.

